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Currently, courts, Restatement drafters, and analysts debate 
the role, if any, that fault plays in contract law.1  According to 
many judicial opinions, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and 
various analysts, the reasons for failing to perform a contract, 
whether willful, negligent, or unavoidable, have little or no bear-
ing in determining contract liability.2  These authorities claim that 
contract liability is “strict,” meaning that the reasons for nonper-
formance are irrelevant in determining the injured party’s rights.3  
But other sources believe that the reasons for failing to perform, 
which focus on whether non-performance is the promisor’s fault, 
are crucially important in the resolution of many, perhaps most, 
disputes under contract law.4  The topic of this symposium is 
  
  Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  For extensive discussion 
of fault in contract law, see Symposium, Fault in American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 1341 (2009). 
 1. See, e.g., Symposium, Fault in American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341 
(2009). 
 2. See George M. Cohen, The Fault That Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 1445, 1446 (2009) [hereinafter Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law] (“The myth that 
contract law is a system of strict liability stubbornly persists.”).  
 3. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 737, 761 (4th ed. 2004); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Ariel Porat, Foreword: Fault in American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1341 
(2009); (“The basic rule of liability in contract law is no fault.”); Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) 
Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1381 (2009) (case law reflects the 
lack of relevance of fault); Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1351, 1361-62 (2009) (explaining that contract liability is strict in that 
“the victim of the breach need not prove fault by the contract breaker” and that moving to a 
fault analysis would “change the law”). 
 4. For additional commentary consistent with this point, see Cohen, Fault Within 
Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1455 (“Contract doctrine contains numerous direct expres-
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“Contract Law in 2025.”  So the question I address here is:  what 
will become of the dispute about fault in contract law in the next 
twelve or so years?  In Part I of this essay, I summarize the argu-
ment that fault does not matter.  In Part II, I argue that fault 
plays an important role in contract law today.  In Part III, I make 
the prediction that by 2025 the controversy likely will disappear. 
Before proceeding, it is important to define two terms used 
throughout this article.  First, what do I mean when I say that the 
promisor was at fault?5  There are many reasons for failing to per-
form a contract.  A party may want to take advantage of better 
opportunities elsewhere with the belief that the gain from breach-
ing will exceed contract damages liability.  Or a party may have 
entered into a losing contract and refuse to perform for that rea-
son.  Or a party may decline to perform unless the other party, 
who has relied on the contract, agrees to provide additional com-
pensation to the promisor.  Each of these failures to perform con-
stitutes a breach and is willful in the sense that the promisor de-
liberately decides not to perform.6  A party may also fail to take 
appropriate action to ensure performance and become unable to 
perform.  Such conduct constitutes negligent or reckless behavior 
and is a breach.7  However, if a promisor has done all that is rea-
sonably possible to avoid breach, but changed circumstances make 
performance impossible or impracticable, the promisor has neither 
willfully nor negligently breached.  The same conclusion applies to 
a party who fails to perform because the contract terms are unen-
forceable on grounds such as unconscionability, duress, or the like.  
  
sions of fault.  The Restatement and UCC include the following terms, all of which natural-
ly invite a fault inquiry: best efforts, diligence, fault, fraudulent, good (and bad) faith, injus-
tice (and justice and unjust), justified, know and reason to know, mitigate, negligent, pre-
caution, reasonable, unconscionable, and willful.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault 
in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, 
and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2009) (“[I]t should not be surprising 
that fault is a pervasive element in contract law.  Some areas of contract law, such as un-
conscionability, are almost entirely fault based.  Other areas, including interpretation, 
include sectors that are fault based in significant part.  Still other areas, such as liability 
for nonperformance, might superficially appear to be based on strict liability, but can best 
be understood as resting in significant part on fault.”) (emphasis added).  See generally 
Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505 (2002).  
 5. For a discussion of the fogginess of willful breach, see Richard Craswell, When Is a 
Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link Between Definitions and Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1501, 1502-04 (2009). 
 6. Craswell sees an ambiguity in the concept of willfulness based on the failure to 
determine “which event in the sequence leading up to the breach should be assessed for 
deliberateness or intentionality.”  Id. at 1515. 
 7. See Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1431, 1438 (2009) (a 
breacher is at fault when the breacher fails to take reasonable precautions). 
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As used here, “fault” encompasses willful, reckless, and negligent 
breaches.8  It does not include failures to perform if the party has 
taken adequate precautions but simply cannot perform because of 
changed circumstances or if the terms are unconscionable or the 
like.  In fact, in the latter situation, we shall see that the promisee 
is the one at fault.9 
This leads to the second definitional issue.  “Contract liability” 
encompasses two separate issues.10  “Contract liability” may refer 
to whether a promisor who has failed to perform has breached the 
contract.  Despite my observation above that not all failures to 
perform are breaches and that a promisor who fails to perform 
may have a valid defense, some authorities insist that the reasons 
for failing to perform have little or no place in the analysis of 
whether a party has breached a contract.11  “Contract liability” 
also may refer to the measure of money damages or other relief.  
Some legal scholars who maintain that contract liability is strict 
focus on remedies.12  They argue that the reasons for breach have 
no effect on contract remedies.13  Some analysts also stake out a 
normative position that courts should not consider fault in deter-
mining breach or remedies (although theorists are not always 
clear on whether they are describing the current state of contract 
law or explaining what it should be).14  I argue in Part II that both 
the breach and remedy visions of strict liability are incorrect in 
that in many, if not most, contracts cases, fault figures in both the 
determination of breach and the measurement of damages or oth-
er relief. 
  
 8. Judge Richard Posner argues that courts should treat only negligent breaches as 
fault-based.  See Posner, supra note 3, at 1353-54.  According to Posner, negligent breaches 
diminish society’s resources, but deliberate breaches are efficient.  Id. 
 9. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
 10. Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1446. 
 11. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 3, at 1344 (“The primary ambition of this 
Symposium . . . is to inquire into the reasons why fault plays no more than a limited role.”); 
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 32 (1985) (“Even though the fundamental rule governing breach of contract is a 
strict liability rule, ancillary contract rules based upon fault do exist.”); Posner, supra note 
3, at 1351 (“The option theory of contract . . . implies that liability for the breach of a con-
tract is strict.”); Scott, supra note 3, at 1382 (“The core of contract law as applied in the 
courts is a no-fault regime.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1446 (discussing and 
refuting the “strict liability paradigm”); see also Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means 
a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, – and nothing else.”). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. Judge Posner, for one, appears to advocate on efficiency grounds that liability 
should be strict, regardless of the actual judicial approach.  Posner, supra note 3, at 1351. 
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As we shall see, several reasons underlie contract law’s heavy 
use of fault concepts in assessing failure to perform and appropri-
ate remedies.  For example, a court may view as immoral and wor-
thy of condemnation a promisor who willfully or negligently 
breaks a promise and import those perceptions into legal decisions 
and rules.15  Or a court may measure the reasonableness of a par-
ty’s conduct with the goal of administering a fair and equitable 
system of exchange.16  Or a court may focus on creating incentives 
to facilitate efficient outcomes, a strategy that necessarily encom-
passes the reasons for breach and the assessment of remedies.17  
Of course, such reasons are not mutually exclusive, although ana-
lysts who recognize fault’s role in contract law sometimes dispute 
whether moral reasons or incentives predominate.18  In light of 
undisputable evidence of, and strong reasons for, assessing fault 
in contract law, the mystery is why the no-fault perception per-
sists. 
In Part III of this essay, I predict that this perception cannot 
last.  Part of the reason should be obvious already after reading 
this introduction.  If I am right that fault already plays a huge 
role in contract law, perceptions to the contrary should wither 
away (although they have lasted for a long time).  And we will see 
that sources already are wavering.19  In addition, I show why 
technological advances that have changed the manner in which 
many contracting parties do business and that have increased the 
opportunities for advantage-taking and information gathering 
suggest an even larger role in the future for fault in contract law. 
I.  THE PERCEPTION THAT THE REASONS FOR FAILING TO PERFORM 
DO NOT MATTER 
Much judicial language and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts lend support to the idea that fault is irrelevant in assessing 
  
 15. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1414; see also Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract 
Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009) (a promise is a moral commitment to perform). 
 16. For example, a court may assess fault in determining which party should bear the 
risk of a misunderstanding concerning the meaning of their agreement or whether a 
breaching party is likely to cure a default. 
 17. For example, if a party cannot perform because of an unanticipated catastrophic 
event through no fault of her own, holding the party to performance will not create incen-
tives for greater care. 
 18. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 3, at 1344 (“Damage booster[s] . . . have 
nothing to do with the mens rea of the promisor, the volition of his act, or its morality . . . .  
Instead, the willful-breach cases have to do with incentives.”). 
 19. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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contract breach and remedies.  Some courts posit that the reasons 
for breach do not matter because a contract obligation is nothing 
more than an option to perform or pay damages.  Judge Richard 
Posner is a champion of this position both in his judicial opinions 
and in his influential writings on contract law.  For example, 
Judge Posner reasons: 
What is true and worth noting is that the civil law—the law of 
Continental Europe, as distinct from Anglo-American law—of 
contracts places an emphasis on fault that is not found in the 
common law.  As Holmes remarked, the common law con-
ceives of contracts as options—when you sign a contract in 
which you promise a specified performance you buy an option 
to either perform as promised or pay damages, unless damag-
es are not an adequate remedy in the particular case.  Wheth-
er you were at fault in deciding not to perform—you could 
have done so but preferred to pay damages because someone 
offered you a higher price for the goods that you’d promised to 
the other party—is therefore irrelevant.20 
A related claim focuses on the goal of contract remedies, which 
is to award damages sufficient to compensate the injured party for 
the loss of the expected performance.21  Assuming full compensa-
tion (itself a dubious proposition in light of compensation hurdles 
such as foreseeability, certainty, and attorney’s fees rules), this 
approach demonstrates that courts ignore fault issues in assigning 
remedies.22  By awarding only expectancy damages and denying 
punitive damages and specific performance, courts refrain from 
punishing the breacher or compelling performance.  By granting 
expectancy damages and nothing less, courts refrain from penaliz-
ing the injured party.  As such, fault plays no role in assessing 
damages.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts reinforces this 
perspective: 
  
 20. Bodum USA, Inc., v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 634 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted).  Many courts follow this reasoning.  See, e.g., Kase v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 
218 F.R.D. 149, 156 n.9 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“Because [plaintiff’s] only remaining cause of 
action is for breach of contract, not fraud or negligence, issues such as intent and lack of 
accident or mistake are irrelevant to this lawsuit.”).  
 21. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 163-88 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinaf-
ter HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES].  
 22. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 761 (noting that “contract law is, in its 
essential design, a law of strict liability, and the accompanying system of remedies operates 
without regard to fault.”). 
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The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not 
been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but 
compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from 
breach.  “Willful” breaches have not been distinguished from 
other breaches, punitive damages have not been awarded for 
breach of contract, and specific performance has not been 
granted where compensation in damages is an adequate sub-
stitute for the injured party.23 
Many courts appear to follow the Restatement position.  The fol-
lowing language is typical: 
The law does not condone breach of contract, but it does not 
consider it tortious or wrongful.  If a party desires to breach a 
contract, he may do so purposely as long as he is willing to 
put the other party in the position he would have been had 
the contract been fully performed . . . .  Fault is irrelevant to 
breach of contract.24 
Similarly, another court has stated that “a promisor’s motive for 
breaching his contract is generally regarded as irrelevant because 
the promisee will be compensated for all damages proximately 
resulting from the promisor’s breach.”25  Some courts are not even 
tested by the degree of nastiness of the breach:  “motive, regard-
less of how malevolent, remains irrelevant to a breach of contract 
claim and does not convert a contract action into a tort claim ex-
posing the breaching party to liability for punitive damages.”26 
Prominent legal scholars (including Judge Posner in his scholar-
ly writings) also maintain that fault is either irrelevant to issues 
  
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (1981).  The law and 
economics movement likely influenced the Restatement (Second) position.  For example, 
Allan Farnsworth, the reporter of the Restatement (Second), wrote a description in his 
treatise of the legal-economists’ position that parrots the Restatement (Second): “‘Willful’ 
breaches should not be distinguished from other breaches.”  FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 
737; see also Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733, 736 (1982). 
 24. Eichmann v. Nat’l Hosp. and Health Care Servs., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1999) (quoting Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1050 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). 
 25. Rockford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pirtle, 911 N.E.2d 60, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 
Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976)); see also Koufakis v. 
Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 906 (2d Cir. 1970) (“A breach is a breach; it is of marginal relevance 
what motivations led to it.”). 
 26. JRS Prod., Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840, 852 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
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of both breach and remedies27 or that fault plays a limited role.28  
Some of these writers follow the courts that adopt a narrow view 
of the nature of a contract promise.29  These scholars often rely on 
Holmes’s adage that a contract means no more than a promise to 
perform or to pay damages.  They argue that a promisor who fails 
to perform but who fully compensates the promisee for her loss 
has not broken a promise, and therefore is not at fault.30  In fact, 
we will see that the logical conclusion from this observation, ad-
herents believe, is that contract law should and does encourage 
breach if the promisor is better off by breaching after compensat-
ing the promisee with expectancy damages.31 
Beyond conceptualizing the content of a contract promise as 
narrow, some analysts argue that strict liability is good policy, 
sometimes intimating that the enumerated policy is so persuasive 
that contract law must be following it.  For example, Judge Posner 
claims that no-fault “minimize[s] the expense and uncertainty of 
litigation” because it requires only a “comparison . . . of the lan-
guage of the contract with the fact of nonperformance.”32  He ar-
gues that fault, on the other hand, is an unruly concept that in-
creases the cost of dispute resolution or litigation.33  Contract law 
opts for strict liability, as the argument goes, to minimize such 
costs. 
Judge Posner also asserts that strict liability “reduces transac-
tion costs by optimizing risk bearing.”34  By this he apparently 
  
 27. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1350 (discussing Holmes) (“[W]hen you sign a contract 
in which you promise a specified performance . . . you buy an option to perform or pay dam-
ages.”). 
 28. See, e.g., E. Posner, supra note 7, at 1431 (“[A]lthough Anglo-American contract law 
is usually called a strict-liability system, it does contain pockets of fault.”); Saul Levmore, 
Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict Liability, and Mitigation in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 1365, 1366 (2009) (“Contract law has been understood as deploying strict liability, but 
it is strict only to a point—because once the ‘duty to mitigate’ is at issue, fault comes into 
play as courts consider the reasonableness of the post- and even the prebreach mitigation 
efforts.”); Richard Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 164, 168 (1983) 
(“A must make and break a promise, but B is not required to prove that the breach was 
negligent or intentional or otherwise ‘wrongful.’”).  
 29. Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1447 (describing the position). 
 30. Posner, supra note 3, at 1350; Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be 
Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2009).   
 31. See infra notes 112-119 and accompanying text. 
 32. Posner, supra note 3, at 1353; see also Scott, supra note 3, at 1392. 
 33. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1353, 1359; see also Craswell, supra note 5, at 1502 
(indeterminacy of the term “willful”); E. Posner, supra note 7, at 1431 (“[T]he disadvantage 
of [a fault-based system] is that courts would need to make difficult inquiries and could 
make more errors.”). 
 34. Posner, supra note 3, at 1351. 
282 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 52 
means that the promisor is generally the superior risk bearer—the 
party best able to prevent the risk or insure against it35—and 
strict liability creates incentives for the promisor to take the most 
efficient level of precautions against those risks.36  Precautions 
“range from quality control to backup supplies to purchasing in-
surance to not promising in the first place.”37 
Some analysts who describe contract law as largely strict at-
tempt to explain away doctrines that seemingly focus on fault, ar-
guing that economic explanations that do not entail fault are 
clearer and more persuasive.38  Others more boldly assert that 
case law does not bear out the claim that courts generally rely on 
fault concepts.39  Further, they claim that commercially sophisti-
cated business parties generally prefer strict liability.40  I respond 
to Part I’s descriptive and normative arguments supporting strict 
liability in the next section. 
II. THE REASONS FOR FAILING TO PERFORM CURRENTLY PLAY AN 
IMPORTANT ROLE 
The following discussion sets forth a selection of the leading 
contract principles and doctrines of today in which fault plays a 
role.  The discussion also evaluates, where relevant, the leading 
alternative claims of strict liability adherents set forth above.  
Subsection A discusses contract law’s use of fault in assessing 
whether a party has broken the contract.  Subsection B analyzes 
fault in the context of determining remedies. 
  
 35. See Posner and Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89-91 (1977); see also Cohen, Fault Within Con-
tract Law, supra note 2, at 1457.   
 36. Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1448 (explaining the approach); 
see also Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2009) (“[I]n general the expectation remedy is sufficient to pro-
vide optimal deterrence.”).  But Scott points out that strict liability may fail to deter promi-
sor inefficiencies such as failing to take precautions to ensure performance and promisee 
inefficiencies such as failing to mitigate before the promisor’s repudiation.  Scott, supra 
note 3, at 1393-94.  
 37. Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1453. 
 38. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 1357 (“[T]he fact that the law uses moral lan-
guage doesn’t mean that legal duties are moral duties.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 1382 (“The core of contract law as applied in the 
courts is a no-fault regime.”). 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 1383 (“[B]oth autonomy and efficiency values support the claim that 
commercial parties will prefer strict liability rules to fault-based rules for assessing per-
formance and the response to nonperformance.”). 
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A. Contract Breach 
The nature of a promise.  We saw that some advocates of strict 
liability rely on Holmes’s pronouncement that a contract is a 
promise to perform or to compensate the promisee for non-
performance.41  A promisor who chooses the latter therefore cannot 
be at fault.  But this is a very narrow view of the nature of a con-
tract promise.  At minimum, this view ignores the many contracts 
that explicitly or implicitly import standards of care, such as best 
efforts, due care, and good faith (I address the latter shortly).42  
Even in the absence of a judicial invocation of such standards, 
Holmes’s view ignores the reasonable expectations of most com-
mercial parties who understand that the costs of contract break-
down, whether in the form of settlement negotiations, dispute res-
olution, or lawsuits, are generally a poor substitute for perfor-
mance and the creation of a good working relationship.43  In fact, 
non-legal “business cultures” govern the day-to-day relations of 
many parties who believe that they should honor agreements and 
avoid “legalese.”44  These parties reasonably believe that a con-
tract promise is to perform the contract.45 
A contract promise requires performance for moral reasons as 
well.46  As a general matter, morality requires people to look out 
for the personal and property interests of others.47  In particular, 
  
 41. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text; see also Posner, supra note 3, at 
1350; Shavell, supra note 30, at 1569. 
 42. See Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1450-51.  Cohen also points 
out that “parties often draft terms designed to discourage certain conduct” such as “satis-
faction clauses[.]”  Id. at 1451. 
 43. See, e.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 66-67 (1980); Cohen, Fault 
within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1450 (“[W]e should be wary of theoretical justifica-
tions for strict liability that depend on overly confident assertions of mutual intent.”); 
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985); see 
also Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Ariz. 1999) (“[T]he contract rule is and has 
always been that one should keep one’s promises.”).  
 44. See Macaulay, supra note 43, at 467; Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and 
World Outside the Law Schools’ Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 247, 260 (1991). 
 45. Id., see also BARRY NICHOLAS, FAULT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT, IN GOOD FAITH 
AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 337, 345 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995), 
quoted in Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1429 (“Fault is . . . absent from the conventional 
common law conception of liability for breach of contract only because it is in substance 
incorporated in the meaning of ‘contract.’”); Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 1564-66. 
 46. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1428. 
 47. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 12-13 (1997) (describing 
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17 
(1981)); see also Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 1568 n.2 (“By morality, I mean those nonlegal, 
objectively grounded normative principles that regulate our motives, reasons, and  
conduct . . . .”). 
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contract promisors have a “moral obligation to honor [their] prom-
ises” in order to avoid harming the interests of their promisees.48  
According to Charles Fried, the author of the most comprehensive 
moral theory of contract law: 
[A] promise creates a moral obligation because the promisor 
purposefully invokes the “convention of promising.”  A con-
vention is a “system of rules” governing the making of com-
mitments that others can “count on.”  In fact the very purpose 
of the convention of promising is to confer on the promisee 
“moral grounds . . . to expect the promised performance.”49 
Professor Mel Eisenberg observes that “[i]n the area of nonper-
formance, law and morality, although not identical, tend to con-
verge rather than diverge.”50  This is not surprising.  The goal of 
contract law may not be to enforce moral norms directly, but it 
also does not want to promote immoral behavior.51  This is not the 
place, nor is it necessary, to delve deeply into the complex rela-
tionship of law and morality, however.  Suffice it to say that if con-
tracting parties reasonably expect performance, and if promisors 
have a moral obligation to look out for the interests of their promi-
sees, countenancing breach through a narrow view of legal promis-
ing may undermine society’s faith in the contract institution, 
which obviously would have significant instrumental implica-
tions.52  As Lon Fuller commented, the “regime of exchange would 
lose its anchorage and no one would occupy a sufficiently stable 
position to know what he had to offer or what he could count on 
receiving from another.”53  Under such conditions, people may 
choose not to contract even if it would benefit both of them.54  Or 
they may look to non-legal mechanisms for enforcement of their 
arrangements, such as requiring security deposits or premature 
  
 48. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 737 (citing FRIED, supra note 47, at 17). 
 49. HILLMAN, supra note 47, at 12-13 (quoting and describing FRIED, supra note 47, at 
12-13; 16); see also Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2007). 
 50. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1428.  
 51. Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 1552.  As early as 1825, courts in the U.S. worried about 
this issue in contracts cases.  See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207, 210 (“[T]here are 
great interests of society which justify withholding the coercive arm of the law from” moral 
duties.). 
 52. Cf. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 36, at 1484 (“The sanctity of contract is 
infringed not by the willful breach per se, but by the propensity to disregard the full scope 
of the contractual obligation and to chisel away at it.”). 
 53. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 28 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 54. Marschall, supra note 23, at 734, 740. 
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performance that may be costly and inefficient.55  Through the de-
velopment of a doctrine in which fault plays an important role, 
contract law has absorbed these important instrumental reasons 
for rejecting contract damages as an alternative to performance. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that courts look askance 
at purposeful, reckless, and negligent breaches.  The rest of this 
subsection enumerates numerous instances in which courts do so. 
The objective test of contract formation and interpretation.  De-
spite judicial language requiring a “meeting of the minds” for con-
tract formation and for ascertaining the “intent of the parties” in 
contract interpretation,56 contract law actually asks whether a 
reasonable person would believe the parties made a contract and 
decides the meaning of contract terms objectively as well.  Judge 
Learned Hand’s famous dictum in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank 
of New York makes this point: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the per-
sonal, or individual, intent of the parties . . . .  If . . . it were 
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the 
words, intended something else than the usual meaning 
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, un-
less there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the 
sort.57 
Under this objective test of contract formation and interpretation, 
a promisor is liable for misleading use of language, whether pur-
poseful, reckless, or careless. 
There are countless examples of the use of the objective stand-
ard to police purposeful, reckless, and negligent use of language.  
One example suffices here.  Under the misunderstanding doctrine, 
if a material term in a contract is objectively ambiguous and the 
parties are thinking of different meanings of the term, the con-
  
 55. Contract in General, 7 INT’L ENCY. OF COMP. L. 20 (Arthur T. Von Mehren ed., 
1982) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 67 (1977)). 
 56. See, e.g., Haber v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 691, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[I]t 
is the intent of the parties which controls the interpretation of contracts.”); Octagon Gas 
Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 953 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In construing the meaning of a 
written contract, the intent of the parties controls.”); Holbrook v. United States, 194 F. 
Supp. 252, 255 (D. Or. 1961) (“[T]he intention of the parties . . . controls the contract’s in-
terpretation and when that is ascertained, it is conclusive.”). 
 57. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 
201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). 
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tract is unenforceable.58  However, courts enforce one party’s un-
derstanding of the meaning of a term if that party did not know or 
have reason to know the meaning attached by the other party and 
the other party knew or had reason to know the meaning attached 
by the first party.59  In other words, courts determine the meaning 
of language and the enforcement of terms in misunderstanding 
situations by evaluating whether a party is at fault for purposeful-
ly, recklessly, or negligently failing to clarify that party’s view of 
the meaning of terms.60 
The objective approach to contract formation and interpretation 
strikes at the heart of the no-fault claim.  Contract law channels 
behavior toward making enforceable agreements, but it also gov-
erns how to avoid them.  Under the objective approach, careless, 
reckless, or purposefully misleading language can bind a promisor 
notwithstanding the promisor’s actual intentions, thereby “pun-
ishing” the promisor for her fault-based conduct. 
Material breach.  A promisor materially breaches if the promi-
see fails to receive substantially what the promisee bargained for.  
A finding of material breach means that the promisee can suspend 
performance and ultimately cancel the contract.61  Factors for de-
termining material breach include those focusing on the reasona-
ble expectations of the promisee, but other factors also encompass 
the promisor’s actions, including the promisor’s fault.  For exam-
ple, section 275 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts states that 
“the wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing to 
perform” is influential in determining the materiality of a 
breach.62  The second Restatement substitutes a test of the promi-
sor’s “good faith and fair dealing” in determining the materiality 
of a breach, but the result is essentially the same.63  Another factor 
for determining materiality in the Restatement (Second) is the 
likelihood that the breacher will cure its failure, thereby measur-
  
 58. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. Ch. 1864); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 20(1) (1981). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2) (1981). 
 60. See Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1455-56; Eisenberg, supra 
note 4, at 1423-24. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS  §§ 241, 242 (1981). 
 62. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS  § 275(e) (1932). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS d. § 241 cmt. f (1981) (“The extent to which 
the behavior of the party failing to perform . . . comports with standards of good faith and 
fair dealing is . . . a significant circumstance in determining whether the failure is material 
. . . .  In giving weight to this factor courts have often used such less precise terms as “wil-
ful.”). 
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ing at least in part the reliability and sincerity of that party.64  In 
addition, according to the second Restatement, upon a finding of 
material breach, the promisor’s good faith and fair dealing are also 
factors for determining if a promisee may cease her own perfor-
mance.65 
As with the objective approach to formation and interpretation, 
the material breach doctrine goes a long way toward proving the 
importance of fault in contract law.  If fault plays a role in deter-
mining the rights of the injured party to cease performance and 
cancel the contract, there may be few litigated cases of breach that 
do not involve an investigation of fault. 
Good faith and unconscionability.  Not only is good faith a factor 
for determining the materiality of a breach, it also constitutes an 
implied term filling out the performance obligations of a promi-
sor.66  As a general matter, courts find bad faith if the promisor’s 
performance belies the promisee’s reasonable expectations.  Con-
tract language cannot always capture many of the intricacies of 
the parties’ understandings.  In addition, contract drafters rarely 
allocate the risk of all of the contingencies because of their limited 
imagination, experience, and time.  In such situations, the source 
of reasonable expectations is the term society would deem fair and 
reasonable:  “Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed 
to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable.”67  Good 
faith performance therefore rules out conduct that “violate[s] 
community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.”68 
Writer-advocates of strict liability prefer an economic explana-
tion for the good-faith duty.  Judge Posner argues that fault prin-
ciples obfuscate issues and introduce litigation costs.  He therefore 
maintains that good faith is an unnecessary diversion.69  For ex-
  
 64. Id. § 241(d); see also Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 36 (breacher more likely to 
breach again and to be dishonest). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (1981). 
 66. See generally HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 297-303. 
 67. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. a (1981); see Robert A. Hillman, 
"Instinct with an Obligation" and the "Normative Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power", 56 Ohio 
St. L.J. 775, 792 (1995) (citing Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) 
(“[r]easonable parties . . . intend to incorporate the meaning of terms society would find fair 
and just.”); see also Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 
1977) (holding that an at-will employment contract contained an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and that a bad-faith termination constituted a breach of contract). 
 69. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1358 (“There is a legally enforceable contract duty of 
‘good faith,’ but it is just a duty to avoid exploiting the temporary monopoly position that a 
contracting party will sometimes obtain during the course of performance.”). 
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ample, where a buyer has no choice but to accede to the seller’s 
demand for a price increase, Posner comments: 
Courts might describe the seller’s conduct . . . as coercive, ex-
tortionate, or in bad faith, but all they would mean by these 
highly charged words . . . would be that an implicit term of 
every contract (unless disclaimed) is that neither party shall 
take advantage of a temporary monopoly, conferred by the 
contract . . . .  One can if one wants denounce the temporary 
monopolist’s conduct as wrongful, but the adjective adds noth-
ing to the analysis.”70 
I have commented elsewhere on Judge Posner’s position:71 
Of course, the phrase “tak[ing] advantage” in Posner’s defini-
tion is also “highly charged” and requires an investigation of 
the fault-based motives of the seller and the circumstances of 
the buyer.  For example, a seller who believes that changed 
circumstances entitle the seller to more consideration would 
not necessarily be “taking advantage” of a promisee who has 
no market alternatives.  And a buyer with ample substitute 
opportunities would not be the victim of advantage-taking 
even if the seller’s motive was to extract extra-contractual 
gains.  “Temporary monopoly” is also a technical term mean-
ing roughly that the buyer has no reasonable alternatives.  
Determining what constitutes reasonable alternatives in vari-
ous contexts will also tax the courts.  Posner simply may want 
to substitute one set of abstract concepts for another, which 
may not clarify issues or reduce litigation costs at all.72 
The same kinds of considerations that inform the doctrine of 
good faith apply to contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, alt-
hough the two principles differ in that good faith deals with im-
plied terms and unconscionability with express ones.73  Uncon-
scionability applies the “moral standards that are rooted in aspi-
rations for the community”74 to police the manner in which con-
  
 70. Id. at 1358-59. 
 71. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 302. 
 72. For the traditional view, see Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications 
Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852 
n.14 (1979). 
 73. See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1415-18. 
 74. Id. at 1418. 
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tracts are formed and the fairness of the resulting terms.75  The 
history and modern-day applications of the doctrine are well re-
hearsed.76  Here, I only want to make the rather obvious point that 
unconscionability and related doctrines such as fraud and duress 
play an important role in introducing fault into contract law.  
When these principles apply, contract law focuses on the over-
reaching of the promisee and excuses the promisor. 
Torts arising in the contract setting.  Some analysts have found 
it a mystery why tort law is fault-centered and, in their view, con-
tract law is not.77  Of course, this article argues that the dichotomy 
is not very compelling.  But one likely reason for any divergence is 
that courts show little hesitancy in finding a tort in contract set-
tings.78  For example, courts have recognized an “independent 
tort” in the contract context including where a party misrepre-
sents facts during negotiations or recklessly performs a contract.79  
This may relieve the pressure to inject fault into contract law it-
self.80  But, of course, tort and contract are themselves artificial 
legal categories and the significance of the role of fault, whether 
called a component of tort or contract, shows the importance of 
fault in exchange transactions.81 
Impracticability and related excuse doctrines.  Contract doc-
trines such as impracticability, impossibility, and frustration of 
purpose excuse a promisor from performance if unanticipated cir-
cumstances make performance extremely costly, and the promisor 
did not assume the risk of the circumstances.  Under impractica-
bility, for example, courts excuse a promisor “if performance as 
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contin-
  
 75. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002).   
 76. See U.C.C. Art. 5 (2002); see also Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About 
Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(1981). 
 77. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 3, at 1341. 
 78. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON TORTS 660-61 (William L. Prosser et al. eds., 
5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he American courts have extended the tort liability for misfeasance to 
virtually every type of contract where defective performance may injure the promisee.”). 
 79. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1328-33 (S.D. Fla. 
1999); John A. Sebert, Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Con-
tract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1600-
03 (1986). 
 80. See HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 205-07. 
 81. See, e.g., Mauldin v. Sheffer, 150 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (holding engineer 
liable for punitive damages for using plans for one construction project on another unrelat-
ed project); see also Romero v. Mervyn’s, 784 P.2d 992, 998 (N.M. 1989) (awarding punitive 
damages under a contract theory for “malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or . . . reckless[]” 
behavior). 
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gency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made . . . .”82  Performance is “impractica-
ble” if it would result in a severe loss to the promisor.83  The “non-
occurrence of a contingency . . . was a basic assumption” language 
means that the parties made their agreement on the assumption 
that the disrupting event would not occur.84  The Mishara court 
nicely summarized the doctrine:  “It is implicit . . . that certain 
risks are so unusual and have such severe consequences that they 
must have been beyond the scope of the assignment of risks inher-
ent in the contract, that is, beyond the agreement made by the 
parties.”85 
On the other hand, courts will not excuse performance if the 
promisor should reasonably have foreseen the risk and, through 
its own neglect, failed to contract around the risk or to take rea-
sonable precautions against it.86  In this way, fault enters the 
equation in excuse cases.87  Focusing on court dicta such as in 
Mishara, however, some analysts insist that successful excuse 
cases are no exception to strict liability because the promisor did 
not promise to perform under the circumstances.88  This ignores 
the reality that in most excuse cases, the allocation of risk of the 
supervening disruption (whether the promisor promised to per-
form under the circumstances) is uncertain and involves analyzing 
the circumstances to determine what the parties probably intend-
ed or would have intended had they bargained over the matter.  
The often fogginess of this investigation invites courts to consider 
matters such as the fault of the promisor.  In many impracticabil-
  
 82. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2007); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 
(1981). 
 83. See, e.g., Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702 P.2d 930, 933 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1985). 
 84. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 361-62. 
 85. Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Mass. 
1974). 
 86. See, e.g., Roy v. Stephen Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 543 A.2d 775, 778 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1988); see also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1419-22. 
 87. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 630 (“The third requirement for excuse is 
that the impracticability must have resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be 
excused.”). 
 88. See Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1457; Posner, supra note 3, 
1351 (“The promise is to perform or pay damages, and so if you choose not to perform—even 
if you are prevented from performing by circumstances beyond your control—you must pay 
damages.”).  
Summer 2014 The Future of Fault 291 
ity cases, in fact, fault and the degree of harm caused by perfor-
mance are probably the most influential factors.89 
Writers also defend strict liability in excuse cases as good policy 
on efficiency grounds.  For example, Judge Posner asserts that 
courts fill risk-allocation gaps based not on whether the promisor 
was at fault in failing to perform or other factors, but on what “the 
parties could be expected to have done had they negotiated over 
the issue.”90  Further, Posner maintains that parties would have 
allocated the risk to the promisor, who is the “cheaper insurer 
against the risk of nonperformance.”91  According to Judge Posner, 
the promisor must be the cheapest insurer because otherwise the 
promisor would not have made the promise.92  Strict liability 
thereby “reduces transaction costs by optimizing risk bearing.”93  
By definition in impracticability cases, however, the promisor 
cannot calculate the cost of the disabling risk at the time she 
makes the promise because the risk is unforeseeable or at least 
unforeseen.  So it is difficult to see how the decision to make the 
promise depends on whether the promisor is the cheapest insurer.  
And as Professor Porat points out, in many instances the promisee 
may be the superior risk-bearer, such as where a promisor’s per-
formance depends on the cooperation of the promisee or where the 
promisor relies on information about the prospect of performance 
by the promisee.94 
Strict-liability theorists add that strict liability is good policy 
because it diminishes the cost of litigation by replacing fuzzy fault 
principles with the claimed relative certainty of economic analy-
sis.95  But despite these claims that fault issues are costly and un-
certain,96 willfulness or negligence is often indisputable in the con-
text of excuse doctrines.  For example, courts do not excuse a sell-
  
 89. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 630 (citing cases); Robert A. Hillman, An 
Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 652 (1983) (“A 
helpful generalization in predicting a court’s finding on the parties’ risk allocation or in 
predicting how a court will allocate the risk in gap situations is that when losses to the 
promisor would be moderate courts will not excuse performance, but when losses would be 
extreme and the promisor has acted reasonably courts will excuse performance.”) (citing 
cases and authorities). 
 90. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 1353. 
 91. Id. at 1351. 
 92. Id. (a promisor will make a promise to perform or pay damages if the promisor is 
“the cheaper insurer against the risk of nonperformance”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1397, 
1398-1403 (2009). 
 95. Posner, supra note 3, at 1353, 1359. 
 96. See id.; see also Craswell, supra note 5.  
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er who sells goods to a third party that were earmarked for the 
buyer based on an inability to perform.  And a supplier that is con-
tractually obligated to supply molasses from “the usual run from 
the National Sugar Refinery” who fails contractually to assure a 
sufficient supply from the refinery cannot claim reasonable care.97  
In fact, as a general matter, sorting out which party is the superi-
or risk-bearer in any given case may be more costly, time consum-
ing, and indeterminate than filling gaps based on the promisor’s 
fault and the severity of the unanticipated event.98 
B. Contract Remedies 
I now revisit and evaluate the observation of some writers that 
contract law’s principal remedy, expectancy damages, reveals that 
contract liability is strict.  The goal of contract damages, the ar-
gument goes, is compensation, not compulsion, and courts do not 
distinguish breaches in assessing damages.  Nor do they grant 
punitive damages or, ordinarily, specific performance.  The follow-
ing discussion, however, illustrates the many applications of fault 
in contract remedial law and sets forth alternative explanations 
for the dearth of specific performance and punitive damages cas-
es.99 
Measurement of expectancy damages.  The issue of fault often 
arises when courts determine how to measure expectancy damag-
es.  For example, often courts must decide whether to measure 
these damages based on the cost of completing work promised by 
the breaching party or based on the projected increase in the value 
of the promisee’s property if the breacher had performed.  All oth-
er things being equal, courts are likely to choose the higher meas-
ure if a promisor’s breach was willful because courts disapprove of 
  
 97. Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383, 384 (N.Y. 1932) 
(“The defendant does not even show that it tried to get a contract from the refinery . . . .  It 
has wholly failed to relieve itself of the imputation of contributory fault.”). 
 98. Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1452-53; see, e.g., Transatlantic 
Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (concluding that ship owner could insure 
against risk of deviation, but U.S. government charterer could assess the probability of 
closing of Suez Canal); see also John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 
30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1996). 
 99. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 
(1994) (analyzing different measures of damages depending in part on fault); Steve Thel & 
Peter Siegelman, Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of Willful 
Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2009) (“[I]n reality, courts frequently award 
promisees more than their expectation when they find that a breach is willful, and thus act 
to deprive willful breachers of any gains from breach.”). 
Summer 2014 The Future of Fault 293 
this behavior and want to encourage promisors to perform their 
contracts.100 
Another example of fault’s influence on expectancy damages is 
the certainty hurdle of consequential damages.  Injured promisees 
must prove such damages with sufficient certainty so that courts 
have ample guidance on the promisee’s actual loss.101  However, 
comment a to Restatement (Second) section 352, as well as case 
law, reveal that courts relax the degree of certainty required for 
the promisee to recover if the breach is willful.102 
Finally, it is now well accepted that the strength of the theory 
for enforcing a contract may directly affect the measure of damag-
es.  For example, in doctor-patient relations, some courts have en-
forced contract claims against doctors for failed operations.  How-
ever, such courts may be reluctant to grant full expectancy dam-
ages if the doctor has not been negligent:  “Where . . . in a number 
of the reported cases, the doctor has been absolved of negligence 
by the trier, an expectancy measure may be thought harsh.”103  On 
the other hand, if the botched operation is the doctor’s fault, one 
would expect the court to be much less merciful. 
Mitigation of Damages.  The focus of mitigation is on the con-
duct of the injured promisee.104  An injured promisee must act rea-
sonably after breach to minimize the loss.105  Accordingly, the 
promisee must take affirmative steps, such as agreeing to reason-
able substitute opportunities that diminish the loss from breach, 
  
 100. See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 236 (Minn. 1939) (majority 
willing to award much larger cost of restoration damages because “[d]efendant’s breach of 
contract was wilful.  There was nothing of good faith about it.  Hence, that the decision 
below handsomely rewards bad faith and deliberate breach of contract is obvious.  That is 
not allowable.”); see also Kangas v. Trust, 441 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) 
(“[T]he willful violation of the contract by a builder is a factor which may be considered by 
the trier of fact in determining whether the breach requires application of cost of repair of 
diminution in value as the measure of damages.”).  Other factors, of course, play a role in 
these and similar cases. 
 101. See, e.g., Kinesoft Dev. Corp. v. Softbank Holdings, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001). 
 102. See, e.g., Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 
F.2d 634, 643 (8th Cir. 1975) (“The wrongdoer should bear the risk of uncertainty that his 
own conduct has created.”) (citing Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 565 (2d Cir. 
1970)); 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1022 (1964) (“[D]oubts will generally be resolved in favor 
of the party who has certainly been injured and against the party committing the breach.”). 
 103. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 187-88 (Mass. 1973). 
 104. But not always.  Levmore suggests that the mitigation inquiry is one of “compara-
tive fault.”  Levmore, supra note 28, at 1370.  Scott points out that the mitigation principle 
applies to both parties, but it is limited by the rule that allows the promisee to await the 
time for performance before mitigating.  Scott, supra note 3, at 1388-89. 
 105. If the promisee fails to act reasonably to mitigate, the court will require her to 
absorb her own avoidable loss. 
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and must refrain from conduct that increases damages.106  Courts 
may even require an injured promisee to deal further with the 
breacher in order to minimize damages, depending in part on the 
breacher’s motive for the breach.107  For example, if a contract par-
ty breaches deliberately and thereby exhibits its unreliability, a 
court will not require the promisee to accept a new offer from the 
breacher.108  On the other hand, courts also consider the breaching 
promisor’s conduct in mitigation cases if it is the “superior mitiga-
tor,” such as when the breacher can reasonably cure its default.109 
Judge Posner explains the mitigation principle’s purpose as 
preventing a party “from exploiting his temporary, contract-
conferred monopoly in order to obtain a more generous settlement 
of his claim of breach of contract.”110  Applying economic analysis 
to the mitigation question in this way, Posner argues, leads to 
greater clarity.111  But I wonder whether employing language such 
as “exploiting” and “contract-conferred monopoly” produces great-
er clarity than language that declares that the injured promisee 
cannot recover for conduct that would unnecessarily increase the 
damages liability of the breaching promisor, such as declining to 
avail herself of advantageous market substitutes. 
The efficient breach fallacy.  Strict-liability analysts not only as-
sert that expectancy damages are based on strict liability, they 
also argue that the policy of granting expectancy damages pro-
motes breach under certain circumstances.  I have described the 
“efficient breach” theory elsewhere: 
According to the “theory of efficient breach,” expectancy dam-
ages correctly encourage a party to breach when the breach is 
efficient, in that the breach makes some parties better off 
without making anyone worse off.  On the other hand, expec-
  
 106. See, e.g., Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, (Me. 1983) (dealer 
failed to mitigate damages by not accepting a substitute offer for mobile home); Clark v. 
Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“[T]he plaintiff [has] no right, by obsti-
nately persisting in the work, to make the penalty upon the defendant greater than it 
would otherwise have been.”). 
 107. See Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach–Common 
Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 553, 598 (1976) (observing that courts often consider whether a breach was willful or 
unavoidable in determining if the avoidable consequences rule requires an injured party to 
accept a new offer from the breaching party). 
 108. See id. at 560. 
 109. See Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 2, at 1453. 
 110. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1359. 
 111. Id. (“One can if one wants denounce the temporary monopolist’s conduct as wrong-
ful, but the adjective adds nothing to the analysis.”). 
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tancy damages dissuade a party from breaching when a 
breach would cause more losses than gains.  Suppose, for ex-
ample, you agree to sell your piano to [your neighbor] Alice for 
$1200 . . . .  [T]he piano is worth $1400 . . . .  Another neigh-
bor, Bob, offers to buy the piano from you for $1800.  Accord-
ing to the lawyer-economists, expectancy damages allow, even 
encourage, you to break your contract with Alice, to pay her 
$200 (her expectancy damages measured by the market price-
contract differential), and to deliver the piano to Bob, who 
outbid Alice for the piano.  You gain enough from selling to 
Bob instead of Alice ($600) so that you can pay Alice her ex-
pectancy damages and still come out $400 ahead.  Bob, who 
bid the highest for the piano is also better off because he val-
ued the piano more than the $1800 he paid (otherwise he 
would not have made the deal).  Alice is no worse off because 
she recovers her $200 expectancy . . . . 
Lawyer-economists point out that awarding damages greater 
than an injured party’s lost expectancy would be undesirable 
because it would discourage breach when breach would be ef-
ficient.  Suppose, for example, that Alice could recover $200 
lost expectancy damages and $600 punitive damages.  You 
would not breach because it would not be profitable for you, 
even though we have just demonstrated that, without the pu-
nitive damages liability, breaching would make you and Bob 
better off and no one worse off (hence a breach would be effi-
cient).  Awarding damages any lower than expectancy also 
would be undesirable because you would have the incentive to 
breach even when your gain from doing so would be less than 
Alice’s real loss.112 
As noted in the excerpt above, analysts look to the absence of pu-
nitive damages as evidence of contract remedies’ efficient-breach, 
strict liability approach.113  The key to the measurement of dam-
ages, they believe, is, therefore, efficiency, not fault.  There is little 
reason to condemn a contract breaker who is trying to “increase 
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the overall contractual pie” by finding a better opportunity and 
making the promisee whole.114 
The efficient breach hypothesis is interesting and fun to discuss, 
but it has little basis in reality.  For one thing, its basic premise, 
that expectancy damages make the injured party whole, is not ac-
curate.  Consider the various limitations on expectancy awards, 
including the requirements that damages must be foreseeable, 
certain, and caused by the breach; the limitations on prejudgment 
interest; and the lack of compensation for most attorneys’ fees.  
Add the additional expenses and time commitment of possible ne-
gotiation and litigation, and it will be rare indeed for contract law 
to fully compensate a promisee by awarding expectancy damages.  
And the prospect for injured parties of incurring these uncompen-
sated damages and expenses means that breaching parties have 
leverage to extract favorable settlements below their expectancy 
liability.  If injured parties are not fully compensated, of course, 
the foundation of the efficient breach theory collapses. 
The efficient breach strategy is also beset with problems for the 
promisor, who must predict the promisee’s damages if the promi-
sor breaches, including difficult-to-forecast consequential damages 
that must be foreseeable, certain, and unavoidable.  Accurate pre-
diction would require access to the promisee’s business records 
and a determination of how these hurdles would play out if the 
case went to trial.  Further, the promisor must account for the po-
tential damage to its reputation and good will.  These, too, will 
often be incalculable, which itself may be sufficient to deter a 
breach.115 
Furthermore, a rule that encourages breach may ultimately be 
inefficient for a host of reasons.  For example, encouraging the 
promisor to breach may lead to costly negotiations or litigation 
over how much the promisor must pay the promisee to purchase 
the right to breach.  Ian Macneil pointed out that the efficient 
breach theory has: 
[B]ias . . . in favor of individual, uncooperative behavior as 
opposed to behavior requiring the cooperation of the parties.  
The whole thrust . . . is breach first, talk afterwards . . . .  
[However,] “talking after a breach” may be one of the more 
expensive forms of conversation to be found, involving, as it so 
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often does, engaging high-priced lawyers, and gambits like 
starting litigation, engaging in discovery, and even trying and 
appealing cases.116 
Finally, and perhaps most important, countenancing or even fa-
voring efficient breach may undermine society’s faith in the con-
tract institution.117  It is worth reemphasizing Lon Fuller’s point 
that the “regime of exchange would lose its anchorage and no one 
would occupy a sufficiently stable position to know what he had to 
offer or what he could count on receiving from another.”118  A poli-
cy of encouraging or even condoning efficient breach might dis-
courage contract making in situations where an exchange would 
benefit both parties.  Contracting parties understand that circum-
stances may change, so they seek transactional security.  Without 
this security, it would make little sense to contract in the first 
place.119 
In sum, if efficient breach is a fallacy and contract law does not 
encourage breach in some circumstances through expectancy 
damages awards, strict liability advocates have to look elsewhere 
for support. 
III. THE ROLE OF FAULT IN 2025 
Were it not for the prevalence of today’s perception that contract 
liability is and should be strict, nothing I have said so far would be 
very surprising or controversial.  Party conduct influences court 
decisions concerning whether a failure to perform constitutes a 
breach and concerning the appropriate remedy.  Perhaps the most 
obvious reason for the prevalence of fault is that judges and juries 
are human beings who cannot help but be influenced by the de-
gree of nastiness and inconsiderateness of a breach.120  Decisions 
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are full of language and inferences that people should keep their 
promises and that unintentional breaches deserve less approba-
tion than intentional ones.121  Although many have noted that le-
gal rules and moral norms are distinct,122 the latter inevitably in-
fluence the law.  This is not to say that courts are uninterested in 
instrumental reasons for contract rules, but these necessarily en-
compass fault principles too.  For example, in order to encourage 
contract making and the movement of resources to their highest 
valued uses, courts must deter “opportunistic breaches.”123  In or-
der to avoid the costs of repeated breakdowns in performance, 
courts must consider the reliability of the breacher.124  So it should 
be no mystery why courts account for fault in contract law.  Of 
course, none of these deeply embedded norms and principles is 
going to change or disappear in the near or, for that matter, dis-
tant future. 
For now, a series of incorrect assumptions fuels the no-fault 
perspective.  We have seen that the no-fault model incorrectly as-
sumes a world of economically rational actors in which injured 
parties are content with nonperformance and compensation if the 
promisor does not perform.  In this context, punishing contract 
breakers produces no benefit, but might deter them from making 
economically rational decisions.  Further, advocates of no-fault 
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erroneously believe that strict liability systematically creates ap-
propriate incentives for promisors to take the optimal level of pre-
cautions to avoid breach.  Proponents of strict liability also yearn 
for clarity in contract law and believe that a fault-free model con-
tributes to that clarity, even though a no-fault regime raises many 
issues of its own.  In sum, today’s advocates of strict liability give 
too little weight to the counter-principles and policies that under-
mine their perception. 
In the future, therefore, no-fault adherents may simply lay 
down their arms.  Evidence of this trend already exists:  many of 
today’s theorists, if pressed, likely understand and would admit 
that the true “rule” is that the parties’ conduct is important in as-
sessing contract performance and the remedies available for 
breach.  In fact, some of the strongest advocates of strict liability 
already hedge a bit themselves.125  I predict that in the future, 
more contracts scholars will bring themselves to repudiate the lore 
that the reasons for breach do not matter. 
Furthermore, technological advances that have changed the 
manner in which many contracting parties do business only por-
tend a greater role for fault in the future.  For example, vendors 
increasingly do business with consumers and small businesses 
over the Internet using electronic standard forms.  Jeff Rachlinski 
and I have already written about the use of such standard forms 
in the “electronic age.”126  We identified various forms of opportun-
ism occasioned by this new form of doing business.  For example, 
we wrote that “e-businesses probably have more avenues for tink-
ering with the presentation format of their electronic boiler-
plate.”127  Some nefarious vendors may use this strategy to confuse 
readers and diminish their comprehension of the rights they for-
feit.128  In addition, these vendors can collect data on the kinds of 
presentations that lead potential customers to link to the terms 
and conditions in order to deter customers from doing so.129  At a 
minimum, vendors who include nasty terms can count on the im-
patience of their customers, who likely will not read the boiler-
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plate at all.130  Notwithstanding these new strategies by vendors, 
traditional fault-based concepts such as unconscionability and 
good faith are suited for, and will likely play a greater role in, po-
licing against these various new forms of opportunism. 
Technological advances such as smartphones may also lead to a 
greater focus on what constitutes appropriate consumer shopping 
behavior.131  Professor Peppet, for example, points out that 
smartphones “saturate our daily experiences with previously una-
vailable information.”132  Consumers can readily access infor-
mation such as the reputation of firms, the quality of goods, and 
the nature of standard forms even while shopping in brick-and-
mortar stores, and Peppet asks whether contract law should con-
sider what he calls this “augmented reality” of readily accessible 
information in assessing the enforceability of standard form con-
tracts.  For example, Peppet wonders whether the application of 
doctrines such as unconscionability might be “less and less justi-
fied” in the new “augmented reality.”133  Failure to research and 
read, leading to the enforcement of a marginal contract or term, 
may be the consumer’s own fault. 
Rachlinski and I have responded to Peppet’s thoughtful piece: 
We are nervous about [Peppet’s conclusions], although [he] 
deserves lots of credit for raising the issues and for anticipat-
ing our concerns.  Perhaps most important, everyone knows 
that consumers do not read their standard forms.  There are a 
host of reasons for this in both the paper and digital worlds, 
including impatience and information overload.  Similarly, we 
doubt that consumers will pause very long to use their 
smartphones to gather information, especially about the qual-
ity of the offered standard form.  In addition, to the extent 
that consumers use their smartphones while shopping, they 
may not know how to access some of the pertinent infor-
mation that may be available.  Consumers also may have 
good reason to distrust some of the information they do ac-
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cess, such as reports by consumers on product reliability and 
ratings of products or terms that are often very unreliable.  If 
anything, smartphones are likely to further reduce consum-
ers’ perusal of their standard forms (not to mention cause 
eyestrain trying to read them).  In such an environment, an 
argument can be made that judicial policing of standard 
terms should increase, not decrease. 
Furthermore, as Professor Peppet observes, smartphones 
are becoming ubiquitous among the well-to-do and educated 
segments of our population, but not among the poor and un-
educated.  Although contract law delves into the background 
of its actors in many respects, we wonder if it is advisable 
here.  At minimum, deciding enforcement on the basis of 
smartphone ownership raises lots of additional questions.  For 
example, would ownership of a smartphone be sufficient to 
heighten the duty of consumers to gather information or 
should the duty arise only if the consumer brings the device 
with her at the time of contracting?  If consumers with 
smartphones are to be held to a higher standard, would such 
a rule deter people from purchasing such a device or, if the 
narrower rule applies, deter them from bringing the device 
with them during shopping?  Should people be penalized for 
failing to bring them?  As a general matter, should wealth 
which inevitably increases access to information, heighten the 
duty to investigate through digital information? 
. . . . 
[D]o smartphones change the people who use them?  
Smartphones facilitate access to information about quality of 
products, vendors, and even contract terms.  Smartphones do 
not, however, alter the cognitive factors that lead consumers 
to avoid scrutinizing the boilerplate.  If consumers are unin-
formed because information is costly and difficult to obtain, 
then Professor Peppet’s observations help put courts on the 
right path.  But if consumers decline to read or investigate be-
cause they believe that doing so is of little use to them, then it 
is hard to see how smartphones can make much difference.134 
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I do not rule out the possibility that some changes brought 
about by new technology will diminish the need for fault-based 
concepts in contract law.  For example, improvements in methods 
for predicting acts of nature may narrow the circumstances for 
applying excuses such as impossibility and impracticability.  In 
addition, new technology allows for the rapid dissemination of bad 
publicity that may rein in opportunism.  For example, watchdog 
groups on the Internet can search for and discover unfair terms in 
vendors’ standard forms and rapidly publicize these terms.135  The 
outcry when Facebook attempted to change their terms in order to 
appropriate its members’ information evidences this phenome-
non.136  Thinking imaginatively, perhaps new methods of deter-
mining expectancy damages that utilize future computer pro-
grams may narrow the discretion of courts to employ fault in as-
sessing damages.  Notwithstanding these ideas, this symposium 
asks about contract law in 2025.  I don’t believe any of these ideas, 
or others that diminish the need for fault in contract law, will 
have made their mark by then. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The conclusion can be very brief:  fault is an important concept 
in today’s contract law and will continue to be so, maybe even 
more so, in 2025. 
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